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This paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in
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EEC directive on takeovers.
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An important issue for any firm but the very smallest is how the firm’s owners select the
managers who have authority over the firm’s operations.  This issue is particularly relevant in the
case of a public company with dispersed ownership, where owners are commonly passive and 
managers consequently have substantial discretion to pursue their own goals.
In this paper we examine and assess alternative methods for choosing or replacing the
management team (board) in companies with dispersed ownership.  We focus on three principal
mechanisms: (1) a proxy contest, i.e., a straight vote on replacement of the board; (2) a takeover
bid; and (3) a combination of (1) and (2), specifically, an acquisition offer accompanied by a
vote.  We identify and compare the problems involved in each of these mechanisms.  We show
how combining an acquisition offer with voting can be superior both to straight proxy fights and
to  straight takeover bids, and we put forward a simple and clean arrangement for such a
combined mechanism.  We also show that a mechanism in which shareholders vote on
acquisition offers can exploit the ability of shareholders to draw inferences from market prices.
Our conclusions have implications for a range of arrangements, used in both the U.S. and
Europe, that introduce voting requirements  in conjunction with takeover bids.
We start by analyzing proxy fights.  At first sight, it seems that proxy contests would be a
good way for superior managers to replace an incumbent, given that they do not require the costly
acquisition of shares.  However, straight proxy contests suffer from serious problems that limit
their use to replace managers in practice. In our view, the most serious disadvantage arises not
from the familiar public good problem that challengers will have to bear the costs of a campaign
whose benefits will be largely captured by shareholders.  This problem by itself could be solved1The idea that a rival of uncertain quality may have difficulty in getting shareholders to
vote for it in a proxy contest has been noted previously by Pound (1988) and Bebchuk and Kahan
(1990).
2
by reimbursing successful challengers for their expenses.   Rather, the fundamental difficulty
with a proxy contest, we argue, is that of persuading shareholders that a  rival’s victory would be
beneficial for them.
Because control provides private benefits, the fact that a rival is interested in replacing the
incumbent does not imply that the rival would manage the company better.  Consequently, if
shareholders do not observe the quality of rivals, but know that the average quality of potential
rivals is worse than the incumbent’s, the rational strategy of shareholders will be to vote for the
incumbent.  Indeed, we show that, even if the quality of a certain rival is known by the most
informed shareholders, voting shareholders may well be unable to infer this quality from the
market price and thus may vote generally for the incumbent.  As a result, even a rival who in fact
would be better might have difficulty in persuading the shareholders to vote for it.
1  This problem
of proxy fights can be overcome by a rival’s putting an acquisition offer on the table.  A rival that
would in fact be better can offer a high bid that would make it clear to the shareholders that they
would benefit from the rival’s gaining control without having to convince them of the rival’s
superior abilities.
There are two other potential problems with pure proxy contests that tender offers can
overcome.  First, it might be the case that a rival could create a higher value, but some of this
value would flow directly to the rival (in the form of private benefits or synergies) and a victory
by the rival  in a proxy contest would thus be against the interests of shareholders.  In this case,
the rival can still gain control by making an acquisition offer to buy shareholders out at an2 Models examining proxy fights and their problems have largely focused on issues other
than the ones we analyze.  Gilson and Schwartz (2001) view proxy fights as inferior because
shareholders affiliated with the incumbent might have more intense preferences and be more
likely to vote and thus might carry the day even when they constitute a minority of the
shareholders.  This concern also leads them to take the opposite view to ours on the desirability
of requiring takeover bidders to win a shareholder vote.  Bhattacharya (1997), Maug (1999), and
Yilmaz (1999) focus on information aggregation in proxy contests, but they do not compare the
problems of proxy contests with those of takeovers.  Two early models of the choice between
proxy fights and tender offers, which also differ from our approach, are Harris-Raviv (1988) and
Shleifer-Vishny (1986).  Shleifer-Vishny (whose work we discuss further in Section III) follow
Manne (1965) in attributing the rarity of proxy fights as compared with takeovers to high
transaction costs.  Harris-Raviv (1988) focus on the ability of an incumbent facing a rival to
exchange equity for debt to increase the fraction of votes held by the incumbent, and how such
exchanges affect differently the feasibility of a takeover and a proxy contest.
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attractive price. Second, in some cases, achieving the benefits from a change in control would
require a move to concentrated ownership, which a tender offer can accomplish but a proxy fight
cannot.
2
While takeovers do not suffer from the problems associated with pure proxy contests,
they exhibit significant difficulties of their own.  These difficulties, which have been already
recognized in the literature, arise from the fact that a shareholder deciding whether to tender will,
among other things, compare the price offered by the bidder to the value of being a minority
shareholder in the post-acquisition company.  As a result, a shareholder might choose not to
tender even though he wants the bid to succeed (the free-rider problem analyzed in Grossman-
Hart (1980)) or he might choose to tender even though he wants the bid to fail (the pressure-to-
tender problem analyzed in Bebchuk (1985a)).  We show that combining tender offers with
voting on the offer can eliminate both of these distortions.
To be more precise, we argue that a mechanism that works better than either a straight
proxy contest or a straight takeover bid is one under which approval by a vote of shareholders is
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for an acquisition offer to be accepted.  One simple3 Compare Gilson (2001), who opposes the use of “elections” over acquisition offers with
Lipton and Rowe (2001), who defend the poison pill and the elections it forces on hostile
bidders.
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way of implementing such a mechanism would be to change the rules governing mergers to allow
not only the managers but also rival bidders to submit merger proposals to a shareholder vote
(subject to some threshold conditions seeking to eliminate frivolous offers).  Under this
arrangement, anyone seeking to acquire a controlling interest in a company would submit a
proposal directly to the shareholders, and if the proposal is approved by a majority vote it will be
binding on all shareholders, who would then receive equal treatment.
Our analysis supports various arrangements in the U.S. and Europe that introduce voting
in connection with rivals seeking control.  While these arrangements do not all implement the
combined voting-on-acquisition-offers mechanism in the simplest way, they do operate to
condition the success of acquisition offers on approval in a shareholder referendum.  In the U.S.,
for example, the development of poison pills has had the effect of requiring hostile bidders that
seek a control block to oust the incumbent in a proxy fight in order to have the pill redeemed. 
This proxy fight would be effectively a referendum on the acquisition offer.  The poison pill thus
forces hostile bids to go through a vote, and there is an ongoing debate as to whether this critical
consequence of the pill is desirable.
3   Our analysis suggests that this consequence is desirable.  
Our view of poison pills by themselves is thus more favorable than the one financial
economists usually take.  Poison pills can become problematic in our opinion only when
combined with arrangements that make it difficult or even impossible for a rival to get an
effective shareholder vote on its acquisition offer, e.g., in the presence of a classified (or
“staggered”) board.  Similarly, our analysis provides support for those arrangements in the U.K.
and in the proposed Directive for the EEC that  effectively require hostile bidders to be able to4 Although the literature on modeling takeovers and proxy fights is quite large, very little
attention has been paid to this question. The only two exceptions that we know of are Hietala,
Kaplan, and Robinson (1999) and Maug (1999).  The first paper is a case study of what
information shareholders could have inferred from market prices about how two bids compared
in the Viacom-QVC bidding contest.  The second paper considers inferences that shareholders
can draw in proxy voting from market prices in a case in which uninformed shareholders vote
strategically: specifically, they vote in such a way as to make better informed shareholders
pivotal.  In contrast, in our model it is optimal for all rational shareholders to vote on the basis of
whatever estimate of the various outcomes they are able to form (see the discussion in Section
II). 
5See, e.g., Grossman (1989).
5
win a shareholder vote.
One novel element of our model is that, in contrast to the existing literature, we analyze
explicitly how inferences drawn from pre-voting market prices can influence shareholders who
make tender decisions, or who vote in proxy contests or directly on acquisition offers.
4  Such
inferences are important because not all shareholders will incur the expenses needed to acquire
and process all the publicly available information.  Economists have obtained sufficient
conditions for market prices to reflect, and for agents to be able to infer from them, the
information known to the most informed traders.
5  But these conditions apply to the case where
the distribution of security returns is exogenous.   In contrast, in our context, security returns
depend on a decision, a vote by shareholders, which in turn is influenced by the information
embedded in market price, i.e., security returns are  endogenous.
We show that, in the case of a proxy contest, even if a rival’s quality is known to the
informed shareholders studying all public information, other shareholders might well be unable
to draw from market prices any information useful for voting purposes.  In contrast, we show
that,  in a vote on acquisition offers in cash or publicly traded securities, uninformed shareholders
will be able to infer from the market price which way to vote, and they will vote as if they had all6For example, Neeman and Orosel (1999) argue that it might be best to create, for each
election of the board, a market for corporate votes that is separate from the market for corporate
shares.  However, as they recognize, such a separation can also create new distortions.  
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the publicly available information about the target’s independent value.  That is, voting works
better when the choice is between the incumbent’s uncertain value and the certain value of an
offer in cash or publicly traded securities, and less well when the choice is between the
incumbent’s uncertain value and the rival’s uncertain value.
The scope of our project is limited in two important ways.  First, we restrict ourselves to
analyzing and comparing the three mechanisms noted above.  We thus do not explore the full set
of possible mechanisms to see whether any other mechanism could perform even better.
6 
Second, we analyze situations in which a rival is permitted to seek control, and we focus on the
performance of alternative mechanisms for determining whether control will be transferred in
such a case. In the U.S., many companies have charter provisions that limit substantially the
points in time when rivals can launch a control contest.  We leave for another day the question of
when (or how often) rivals should be allowed to trigger the mechanism governing control
transfers.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents our framework of analysis. 
Section III analyzes the problems of pure proxy contests.  Section IV analyzes how voting can be
beneficial when combined with an acquisition offer, puts forward our proposal for making this
combination, and examines existing arrangements that introduce voting in connection with
offers.   Finally, Section V concludes.7 Grossman-Hart (1980) used a model with a continuum of shareholders.  Bebchuk
(1985b, 1988) and Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992) considered the possibility of shareholders
being pivotal, assuming a finite (even if large) number of shareholders.  The possibility of being
pivotal is clearly important to understanding  voting decisions, and we shall therefore use a setup
with a large but finite number of shareholders.  
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Initial situation Rival emerges  Market trading Contest resolved Payoffs 
Fig. 1: Sequence of Events 
1  2  3  4  5 
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II.  FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
T=1: Initial Situation
We consider the following five-stage model: At T=1 a target with dispersed ownership is
managed by an incumbent.  At T=2 a rival emerges and decides whether to enter a control contest
and, if so, which form to use.  At T=3 market trading in the target’s securities takes place.  At
T=4  the outcome of a control contest, if such a contest is launched, will be determined 
by the tender  decisions or voting decisions of shareholders.  At T=5, values will be realized. 
Below we discuss in more detail our assumptions about each of the stages. 
There is a widely held company. There is a large number of small shareholders, each
owning a (quite small) fraction F of the shares of the company.
7   The company has an incumbent
manager I with a negligible fraction of the company’s shares.  (The analysis could be modified to
apply to the case in which I has a non-negligible block of shares as long as this block is small
enough not to provide I with a lock on control or a decisive influence on the outcome of8We also assume that, if the rival makes a tender offer, its offer will be the only one on
the table. The incumbent is assumed to be liquidity constrained (or risk-averse) and so cannot
make a competing bid.
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corporate voting.)  Our analysis thus excludes companies in which I has a controlling or large
block to begin with; such  companies are important, but control transfers in them present
different problems (see Bebchuk (1994)).
 T=2: Possible attempt to obtain control by a rival
At T=2 a rival R arrives and decides whether to seek control--either launch a proxy
contest or a tender offer--to replace I.  We shall assume at this stage that both the proxy contest
route and the tender offer route are feasible.  That is, we assume that (i) elections to the board are
either due or can be requested by R, and (ii) R may launch a tender offer without having to win a
vote beforehand.  (The case in which a poison pill or some other arrangement introduces the need
to win a vote before proceeding with the offer will be considered in section IV.)
The transaction cost of a proxy challenge is cp and that of making a tender offer is ct.  We
assume that the proxy fight is successful if the rival receives more than 50% of the votes and that
the tender offer is successful if the rival receives more than 50% of all the outstanding shares.  If
a tender offer is made, we will assume that it will be for all shares and conditional on gaining
control.  This assumption is made for simplicity and our main results do not depend on it.
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T=3: Market trading
Since we will want to study the inferences that shareholders can draw from market
trading, we will allow for a market in the firm’s shares before the outcome of the bid or proxy
contest is determined.  Thus, at T=3, we suppose that there is market trading (due to some9
liquidity-selling) and a market price P is set.  We assume that market makers take the effort to
obtain and assess all the public information known to the most informed investors.  This includes
information revealed at T=2 as a result of actions and disclosures made by I and R.  Because such
information may be quite important, the estimates of the company’s future value under either I or
R that are formed on the basis of all information publicly available at T=3 might well differ from
the market price at T=1.
We assume that selling involves some small transaction costs borne by the sellers so that
in equilibrium only liquidity sellers will sell.  We also assume that all market participants,
including shareholders, are risk-neutral and that the rate of interest is zero. 
T=4: Shareholder decisions determine who will control the firm 
If a proxy contest or a takeover bid is initiated by R at T=2, its outcome will be resolved
at stage 4.  In the case of a proxy fight, shareholders will decide whether to vote for I or R.  In the
case of a takeover bid, shareholders will decide whether to tender.  In analyzing shareholder
decisions, we will suppose that shareholders can be divided into three categories:
(1) Rational Informed shareholders (including market makers):   These shareholders, who
own a fraction "I of the shares, incur the costs of studying the relevant public information
concerning the characteristics of R and I.  We suppose that "I is negligible, but that informed
shareholders have enough wealth to determine the market price (by placing orders that would
prevent any deviations from the price that reflects the relevant public information).
(2) Rational uninformed shareholders:  These shareholders (which might in part be
institutions) do not spend the time and expense to learn the characteristics of R and I.  They are
able, however,  to draw rational inferences and can be expected to act “rationally.”  They make9 Some results can be stated more simply if one assumes that , is very small, and we will
make the assumption throughout that , is sufficiently small for these purposes. See footnotes 12,
13, 15, and 26.
10 In particular, in the event that noise investors are important, which has probability ,,
the likelihood that a shareholder with a fraction F of the shares will be pivotal will be F/"H. 
Thus the likelihood that any given rational shareholder will be pivotal is ,F / "H.
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voting and tendering decisions based on the general information they have about the probability
distributions from which R and I’s characteristics are drawn and on the inferences they can draw
from the market price. 
(3)“Noise”  investors:  These “noise” investors own a fraction "N of the  shares.  They do
not vote or tender rationally.  Rather, a fraction 8 of the shares of these shareholders will support
the rival R, and a fraction 1-8 of the shares of these shareholders will support the incumbent I,
where 8 is a random variable that is uniformly distributed on [0,1].
We assume that "N  takes on two values: "H  >  ½ with probability  ,,  and "L < ½ with
probability 1-,, where , is very small.  Shareholders do not know the realization of 
"N before they vote or tender.
9
Our assumptions imply that, with high probability (when "N = "L < ½) , the rational
uninformed shareholders will have the power to decide the contest, in the sense that if they all
vote for or tender to a particular candidate (as they will do in equilibrium), that candidate will
win.  However, there is always a small chance (when "N = "H)  that the noise investors will be
important.  When they are important, there is some probability that they will give the needed
50% of the shares to I, there is some probability that they will give the needed 50% to R, and
there is some probability that they will split their support in such a way that the decisions of the
rational uninformed shareholders will determine the outcome.  In the last scenario, each rational
uninformed shareholders has some chance of being pivotal.
1011 Our analysis could be easily modified, with little change in results, to apply to the case
in which some fraction of the rational shareholders will not vote because their costs are relatively
high.  Similarly, our analysis would carry over to a case in which the small stakes of some
shareholders (say, institutions) are larger than the small stakes of others (say, retail investors) and
where the cost of participation will prevent the latter but not the former from voting.
11
We will also assume that the cost of voting is negligible for all rational shareholders so
that each of them will vote as long as there is some chance, as is the case under our assumptions,
that the shareholder will be pivotal for the outcome.  There is in fact a large incidence of
shareholder participation in corporate voting.  This can be explained by noting that for many
shareholders the cost of voting is small and many shareholders are institutions holding a
significant number of shares (which increases the chance, however small, of being pivotal).
11
Our assumptions can be shown to rule out the phenomenon analyzed by Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997), whereby uninformed voters vote  “strategically” (e.g., some of them abstain)
in order to make informed shareholders decisive.  This possibility does not occur here since, if a
rational uninformed shareholder finds that he is pivotal, the correct inference will not be that
informed shareholders have certain information, but rather that the noise voters are numerous ("N
= "H) and have voted in a certain way.  In other words, because the noise votes are randomly
distributed and the rational informed votes are negligible, the fact that a rational uninformed
voter has turned out to be pivotal conveys no information about whether the rival or incumbent is
better at operating the firm.  Thus, in the event that a rational uninformed shareholder turns out to
be pivotal, the shareholder would prefer to cast its vote “sincerely,” i.e., in favor of the outcome
that, based on the information that the shareholder has, the shareholder estimates to have a higher
expected value. 
Finally, we shall assume that, in making their tender decisions or voting decisions,
rational shareholders will use only pure strategies.  As we shall see, an equilibrium in pure12
strategies always exists in our model.
 
T=5: Realization of cash flows and private benefits
If R fails to gain control at date 4, then, at date 5, cash flows will be YI and private
benefits will be BI.  We will denote by VI = YI + BI the total value under I.  We will focus on the
case in which BI <<YI.  This is the most relevant case since we have assumed that the company is
widely held.  Bebchuk (1999) shows that, when private benefits are large, it will be optimal for
the initial capital structure of the company to include a control block rather than to leave control
up for grabs.  In other words, given our assumption that the company has widely dispersed
ownership, it is reasonable to suppose that initial private benefits are small, i.e., VI is
approximately equal to YI.
If R gains control, then cash flows will be YR and private benefits will be BR.  We allow
for the possibility that BR will be small or large.  We denote the total value under R by VR = YR +
BR.   
To formalize the idea that some shareholders are imperfectly informed about YI and YR,
we suppose that (YI, YR) is drawn from a probability distribution function, with mean (YI
*, YR
*),




this distribution function (plus anything they infer from the market price).  Rational informed
shareholders, however, are assumed to know both YI and YR (though we will comment on the
case in which YI and YR are private information and thus are not known even to informed
shareholders). 
Our interest will be in whether the outcome is efficient–that is, in whether a control13
transfer takes place if and only if it increases total value (net of transaction costs).  To be sure,
there are other issues that might be significant from a social or at least private point of view, such
as the division of surplus in the event of a control transfer, various ex ante effects, and so forth. 
But while the question of an efficient ex post outcome is not everything, the issue is certainly
sufficiently important from the perspective of either social or private optimality that it deserves
careful study.  
III.   PROXY CONTESTS
A. Conditions Under Which Proxy Contests Work Well
Before we analyze the problems and imperfections that prevent pure proxy fights from
working well, it is useful to begin with a hypothetical benchmark case in which they do work
well.  The next proposition provides sufficient conditions for a proxy contest to yield an efficient
outcome, i.e., for control to be transferred if and only if VR - cp > VI.   We denote YR - YI by 
)YR. 
Proposition 1:  Assume that R must resort to a proxy contest if it wants to replace management. 
Then the following (approximate) conditions are sufficient to ensure that R will launch a contest,
and all rational shareholders will vote for R, if and only if a control transfer via a proxy fight is
efficient:
A1: BR > cp;
A2: VR - cp > VI if and only if YR > YI; and12This assumes that , is sufficiently small (see footnote 9).  R will win with probability 1
- [, ("H - ½)/ "H)].  Thus, R will profit from launching the contest only if 
BR (1 - ,[ ("H - ½)/"H]) > cp.  And if A1 holds and , is sufficiently small this condition will hold. 
13This again assumes that , is sufficiently small.  There is a small likelihood of 
, ("H - ½)/ "H  that R will win, and it is assumed that , is sufficiently small so that 
[, ("H - ½)/"H] BR < cp.
14
A3: Whether )YR is positive or negative is common knowledge to all shareholders.
Proof:  Suppose first that a replacement of I via a proxy contest is efficient, which implies that VR
- cp > VI.  Given A2, this implies that YR>YI.  Given A3, the shareholders will know this.  Thus,
if R launches a contest, all rational shareholders will vote for R. 
Hence, if R launches a bid, R will win with a very high probability.  Given condition A1,
this in turn implies that launching a contest will be profitable for R.
12
Now suppose that replacement of I via a proxy contest would be inefficient.  This means
that VR - cp < VI.  Given A2, this implies that YR<YI.  Given A3, the shareholders will know this,
and all rational shareholders will vote against R.  R will consequently lose with a very high
probability, and R will therefore elect not to launch a contest in the first place.
13       Q.E.D
Thus, if conditions A1-A3 hold, then the proxy contest mechanism ensures that a pure
proxy contest will work well. However, as explained below, some or all of assumptions A1-A3
are unlikely to hold in practice. Relaxing these assumptions will enable us to identify the
problems that prevent pure proxy fights from working well. 
B. Difficulty of Convincing Shareholders That R Is Superior 
1. Shareholders’ Imperfect Information15
Let us start by relaxing A3, the assumption that all shareholders know whether )YR is
positive or negative.  This introduces the problem that we view as the most important
impediment to pure proxy contests--the difficulty that a superior rival has in convincing
shareholders of this superiority.  Rational uniformed shareholders cannot infer from the fact that
a challenger is running that it would be a superior manager. Such inference cannot be made
because a rival could benefit from winning and capturing private benefits of control even if it
would not be a superior manager. 
Because rational uninformed shareholders do not know the actual value of  )YR ,they
will have to vote on the basis of their estimate of  )YR.     If shareholders cannot make inferences
from the market price, they will have to base their voting decisions on )YR*. 
Now even though some rivals might be superior it is plausible to assume that, in the
common case, the average quality of potential rivals is lower than the quality of the incumbent. 
Presumably there are many bad managers in the world who would be more than happy to run a
public company and capture some private benefits of control.  Not being able to distinguish
between the majority of inferior rivals and the minority of superior rivals, rational uniformed
shareholders will generally vote for the incumbent.  Thus, we can make the following
observation:
If rational uninformed shareholders cannot infer information about )YR from the market
price, and if  YR* < YI*, then all rational uninformed shareholders will vote against R even if YR
> YI.  Hence, under these conditions R will never launch a proxy fight.
  It is worthwhile contrasting this observation with the conclusions of  Shleifer-Vishny14See Schrager (1986).
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(1986).  Imperfect information about the rival’s quality is a central element of their model. 
However, they assume that, while shareholders are imperfectly informed about )YR, )YR is
always positive--challengers can always improve performance and the only question is by how
much.  Given this assumption, Shleifer-Vishny reach the conclusion that superior rivals can
always gain control via a proxy fight but not a takeover bid, a conclusion that makes the rare use
of proxy fights puzzling.  Shleifer and Vishny resolve this puzzle by hypothesizing that proxy
contests are costly (see also Manne (1965)).  But there are reason to doubt that the transaction
costs of proxy fights are generally higher than those of takeover bids.
14  Indeed, in many cases,
the reverse is likely to be true.  In addition to the costs of contacting shareholders, tender offers
also involve the transaction costs associated with getting the required financing and with
acquiring a large number of shares.  Because a proxy fight involves a “pure” change in the board,
without a rearrangement of ownership, it is plausible to assume that in many cases a proxy fight
involves smaller transaction costs than a takeover.
  In contrast, in our model, imperfectly informed shareholders are unable to know for sure
that YR is higher than YI and that R is not just after private benefits.  Under these assumptions,
imperfect information does not make the rare use of proxy fights puzzling but instead can explain
it.  In our model, imperfect information can make it more difficult for the rivals who are superior
to stand out among all potential rivals and to convince shareholders to vote for them.
2. Inferences From Market Prices
We have shown that, if rational uninformed shareholders cannot infer information about17
)YR from the market price and must act on the basis of )YR* (which we assume to be negative),
then all rational uninformed shareholders will vote against R even if YR > YI.  The question thus
remains whether such inference from the market price will be possible.  There are two reason
why it might not be.  First, there may be situations in which the rival’s quality is private
information to the rival and consequently even the most informed shareholders do not know YR
but only  YR*.  In our analysis--by assuming that the most informed shareholders do know YR--
we put aside this first reason.  Instead, we focus on the analytically more interesting reason--
which is that, even assuming that the most informed shareholders do know YR and )YR, rational
uninformed shareholders may be unable to infer from the market price any information about
)YR .
In what follows an equilibrium is defined by two strategies:
(i) The strategy of each market maker at T=3 which will specify, for any values of YI and YR,
what price to set; and    
(ii) the strategy of rational uninformed investors at T=4 which will specify, for any market price
that they observe, how they will vote.
Proposition 2:  Assume that market makers know the actual realizations for YI and YR and that
E[)YR*YI = x]  is negative for any 0 < x <  .  Then the unique equilibrium is a “non-revealing” Y
_
equilibrium in which (i) all rational uninformed shareholders vote for the incumbent regardless
of the actual value of  )YR, and (ii) the market price is set at a level of (approximately) YI.  
Proof:  Let us first show that the outcome in the proposition is an equilibrium.  Note first that,15More precisely, the market makers will set the price at (1-()YI + (YR, where
( = [,("H - ½)/"H] is the probability that, despite the voting by all rational shareholders for YI,
voting by noise investors will give the victory to R. 
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given the shareholders’ voting strategy, the rational action for the market maker is to set P at
(approximately) YI.
15   Moreover,  given the market maker’s strategy in setting P, shareholders
cannot infer any information about )YR from the market price.  Thus, it is rational for them to
act on the basis of the mean of the distribution and to vote against R.
Let us next show that there cannot be any equilibrium other than the one in the
proposition.  Note first that there cannot be an equilibrium in which rational shareholders always
vote for R regardless of the market price and the market price is set at (approximately) YR.  For in
such a case, for any price P for which E[ )YR * YR = P] <0, the rational shareholders will be
better off voting for I, which implies a contradiction.  And our assumption that YI
* > YR
* implies
that there must be a price P for which E[ )YR * YR = P] is negative; for if no such case existed,
this would imply that YR
* is not lower than YI
*.
So it remains to consider whether there can be an equilibrium in which rational
shareholders vote for R for some levels of the market price and for I for some other levels of the
market price.  Suppose that shareholders will vote for R if the market price is P1 and for I if the
market price is P2.  In this case, the following contradiction would arise: if YI =P1 and YR =P2,
then no price set by the market at T=3 will be self-fulfilling.  If the market sets the price at level
P1, shareholders will vote for R and the ultimate value will thus be P2.  And if the market were to
set the price at level P2, shareholders will vote for I and the ultimate value will be P1.  Finally, if
the price is set at some level P3, different from both P1 and P2, then, whichever contender is
supported by shareholders at P3, the ultimate value will be either P1 or P2, which again produces a
contradiction. Q.E.D.19
         
  3. Overcoming the Problem
(i) Verifiable plan of action:  Although the problem that we have identified arises in a
wide range of circumstances, note that it does not always arise and a straight proxy fight  is not
always doomed.  A proxy fight may succeed in a case in which the limited information that
rational uninformed shareholders have still enables them to conclude that the expected value of
YR exceeds the expected value of YI.  This could happen if I is a terrible failure.  Alternatively,
this could happen if R’s promise for improvement is based not on a claim for some superior
managerial abilities that are hard to observe but rather on having some attractive and verifiable
plan.  For example, Kerkorian’s 1995 proxy fight against Chrysler’s management  had some
chance of success because it was based on a commitment to distribute Chrysler’s accumulated
cash to shareholders.  (And because the proxy fight had a chance of success, the management in
this case was pressured into adopting some of the elements of Kerkorian’s proposed plan.)
(ii) Signaling by block ownership:  Another way to overcome the information problem is
for the rival to hold or to buy some block of the company’s shares.  This might serve as a signal
that R would improve value.  It might rule out the possibility that R would be an especially bad
manager.  If R holds a non-controlling block of 2, R will be interested in winning only if 2)YR
+ BR > cp.  Thus, if R has a block 2, shareholders’ estimate for )YR (without any inferences from
market prices) will be E[)YR* 2)YR + BR > cp] and not )YR*.  In the Chrysler case,
Kerkorian’s significant stock ownership might have also been helpful in making Kerkorian’s
success possible.  Indeed, Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) found that the median stock holding of
rivals in proxy contests is 9%, and Pound (1988) found that the likelihood of a challenger’s
victory increases with the size of the challenger’s initial holdings.16 Furthermore, note that in many U.S. companies, the presence of a poison pill would
prevent R from acquiring more than 15% of the company’s shares.
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The ownership of a significant but not controlling block, however, may not be sufficient
to convince the shareholders that R’s victory will make them better off.  If R has a block 2 and R
is a worse manager than I but not by much, 2)YR + BR might still be positive.  As a result, if the
probability of such an event is substantial, E[)YR* 2)YR + BR > cp] might be negative even for
a significant level of 2.  That is, the signal might not work unless R acquires a block by itself that
would be so large as to already provide R with partial or full control.
16
(iii) Acquisition offer: With a takeover bid, in contrast, there is a way for R to
communicate credibly to shareholders that R’s gaining control will make them better off without
demonstrating to shareholders what YR is.  To show shareholders that replacement will make
them better off, R does not have to convince them that YR exceeds their estimate of YI.   Rather,
it is enough for R to put on the table an offer with a (cash or cash equivalent) value of A
exceeding their estimate of YI.  As will be discussed shortly, the free-rider problem may still
prevent R from winning control through a takeover bid even if the shareholders recognize that
the bid’s success will make them better off.  But the main point at this stage is that, whereas the
shareholders’ imperfect information about YR might lead them to doubt whether R will increase
the firm’s value, a tender offer is a way for R to remove such doubt: essentially R puts money on
the line to back up his claim that R’s gaining control will benefit shareholders.  Note, finally, that
according to the Mulherin-Poulsen (1998) study, a large fraction of proxy contests that take place
are indeed accompanied by a takeover bid.
C. Other Problems of Pure Proxy Contests 17See, e.g., Clark (1986).
18For an analysis of optimal reimbursement rules for contenders in proxy contests, see
Bebchuk and Kahan (1990).
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1.  Incentives to Engage in a Proxy Contest
Let us relax condition (A1) and consider the possibility that BR < cp. In such a case, even
if R can manage the company better, R has an insufficient incentive to engage in a proxy contest,
since R will make a net loss from the contest even if he wins it.  There is a public good problem:
R bears the transaction costs of replacing the incumbent but does not capture the total gains from
increasing the company’s value. 
Although this problem is often noted in the literature,
17 it is not in our view a fundamental
problem of proxy contests.  There are possible arrangements that would provide winners in
contests with a payment that would give them sufficient incentives.
18   Indeed, U.S. law allows a
contestant to reimburse itself out of the company’s coffers for the cost of running its campaign if
it wins the proxy fight.  Thus, if the imperfect information problem identified above did not exist,
and if a superior R could win if it were to run, then this reimbursement arrangement would be
sufficient to solve the problem.  For in such a case a superior rival would win for sure, get its
costs reimbursed, and make a net gain equal to its private benefits of control. 
2.  The Existence of Large Private Benefits for R
Suppose BR is high, e.g., R is a high-tech company, I is a high-tech start up, and, if R gets
control of I, then R will capture directly substantial synergy gains.  In such circumstances,
condition (A2) may be violated, i.e., we may have VR - cp > VI, but YR < YI.   In a case like this, it19 In principle, R could win a proxy fight by promising to pay the company (or its
shareholders) a sufficiently large amount to make a victory by R worthwhile to shareholders.
Note that such a strategy by R would move the contest away from being a pure proxy fight and in
the direction of the combination of vote and acquisition offer which we will discuss below. 
Furthermore, R would have to continue to make such payments in each subsequent election.  A
tender offer would eliminate the need to make such periodic payments and will replace them with
one large up-front payment.
20See Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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is efficient for management to be replaced.  However, even putting aside the informational
problem and assuming that shareholders know the characteristics of both contenders, rational
shareholders will prefer R not to win and will vote against it in a proxy contest.
Making a tender offer enables R to overcome the problem and make R’s gaining control
beneficial for the shareholders.  Let R offer a price A for shares that satisfies YI < A < VR - ct. 
Note that such an offer will not face the free-rider problem that we will discuss later, because A
exceeds YR (A exceeds YI which in the case under consideration exceeds YR).  Thus R will gain
control with such an offer: in effect R pays shareholders up front for the privilege of extracting
high private benefits, a transfer that is not present in a proxy fight.
19
3.  Efficiency Benefits Arising from Concentrating Ownership Rights
In some circumstances, obtaining the potential efficiency benefits from R’s gaining
control would require R to have a substantial fraction of the income or control rights associated
with the company.  For example, R’s incentive to run I well may be enhanced if R owns a
substantial share of the company’s cash flow rights.
20  It might be also worthwhile to have R
undertake investments that increase the value of VR; and, given the concern that the benefit from
these investments will be expropriated by others who will oust R later on, R may be willing to




Clearly, winning a proxy fight does not enable R to acquire a substantial fraction of either
I’s income rights or I’s voting rights. Such an acquisition, however, can be achieved with a tender
offer.  After buying the shares in a successful bid, R can retain a fraction * of the cash flow rights
and a fraction ( of the voting rights and sell the rest to the market.
IV. TAKEOVERS WITH AND WITHOUT VOTING
In this section we analyze how a combination of voting and acquisition offers can do
better than either voting alone or acquisition offers alone.  We argue that an efficient outcome
can be facilitated by an arrangement under which all acquisition offers are put to a shareholder
vote and approval is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for R to gain control.  We start
by noting how pure takeover bids, even though they do not involve the problems of proxy
contests, suffer from significant shortcomings of their own.
A. Pure  Takeover Bids 
As has been recognized in the literature, the problem with pure takeover bids is that the
individual tender decisions of shareholders may differ from those that would be in their
collective interest.  Let M* denote the expected post-takeover value of minority shares in the
event that the bid succeeds (conditional on the information possessed by rational uninformed
shareholders).  The fundamental difficulty is that, in the face of a bid A, shareholders will base22In our setup, the unique equilibrium in this case is for all rational shareholders to hold
out.
23Note that, given the existence of noise investors, there is always a chance that the rival
will win, and so rational shareholders strictly prefer to tender even though the bid is conditional. 
Thus the unique equilibrium in this case is for rational shareholders to tender.
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their tender decisions not only on a comparison of  A and their estimate of YI  but also on a
comparison of A and M*.  Specifically, there are two problems:
The free-rider problem: The problem is that, if M* > A rational shareholders might hold
out even if A exceeds their estimate of YI.
22  (See Grossman and Hart (1980, 1981); for a recent
formalization see Segal (1999).)  The free-rider problem arises when, in the event that the bid is
going to win, shareholders prefer to hold out and receive the post-acquisition value of the
company rather than tender.  Because of this, an attractive bid fails.
The pressure-to-tender problem: The problem is that, if  M
* < A, rational shareholders
will tender even if A is below their estimate of YI (see Bebchuk (1985a, 1985b)).
23  The pressure-
to-tender problem arises when, in the event that the bid is going to win,  shareholders prefer to
tender rather than remain as minority shareholders in the company. 
B. Combining Voting With an Acquisition Offer 
Suppose that at T=4, prior to shareholders’ tender decisions, R is required to submit its
bid to a vote of shareholders, as suggested by Bebchuk (1985). In particular,  consider the
following voting-on-acquisition-offers mechanism: 
Voting-on-acquisition-offers (VAO) mechanism: If R wishes to make a cash (or cash-equivalent)24  Under existing rules, merger proposals, like all other proposals for fundamental
corporate changes, can be brought to a vote of shareholder approval only by the incumbent board.
We believe, however, that in some cases it might be desirable to have proposals submitted
directly to a shareholder vote. See Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992), who advocate that
shareholders of reorganized firms vote on all cash and noncash bids submitted to them, and
Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001), who advocate allowing shareholders to initiate and approve by vote
the opting-in and opting-out of different takeover regimes. See Bebchuk (2001) for a discussion
of the pros and cons of letting shareholders initiate and approve major corporate decisions.
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bid  A, R’s bid is put to a shareholder vote.  Approval of the bid by a majority of the
shareholders will be both a necessary and sufficient condition for the bid’s success. In particular:
(i)  If the bid fails to gain majority approval in the vote, the bidder will not be allowed to 
proceed with its bid.
(ii) If the bid obtains majority approval in the vote, then all shareholders will be required to
tender their shares (or, equivalently, they can be induced to tender their shares). 
As will be discussed later on, various existing arrangements overlap with this mechanism.
At this stage, we wish to point out that, within the structure of existing corporate law, the
mechanism can be implemented in two “clean” ways.  One way would involve having potential
acquirers proceed through a tender offer, and would (i) require that such a tender offer be
approved in advance by a majority vote; and (ii) in the event that the offer succeeds, allow the
bidder upon gaining control to effect a freezeout at a specified discount below the bid price.
  Alternatively, the mechanism can be implemented by amending the rules governing
mergers to allow potential acquirers to bring a merger proposal directly to a shareholder vote
without the approval of the board of directors.  That is, the mechanism can be implemented by
eliminating the board's monopoly over the merger agenda.
24 
While the above two versions would effectively implement the voting-on-acquisition-26
offers mechanism, this mechanism could be implemented in other ways as well. In particular, as
will be discussed in subsection E, various existing arrangements implement elements of this
mechanism.
Given the mechanism, if the bid succeeds, each shareholder will get its pro-rata fraction
of  A. If the bid fails, each shareholder will gets its pro-rata fraction of
 YI.
    Thus, the optimal
strategy for each shareholder will be to vote for the offer if and only if A exceeds the
shareholder’s estimate of YI.  Thus, we can state the following:
Proposition 3:  Under the voting-on-acquisition-offers mechanism, each rational shareholder will
vote in favor of the bid if and only if  A  is higher than the shareholder’s estimate of YI
(conditional on the shareholder’s information).  
Remarks: It is worth pointing out how the two elements of the mechanism eliminate the
problems of pressure-to-tender and free-riding. Essentially, the mechanism eliminates the
incentives arising from the prospect of becoming a minority shareholder.
(i) Making shareholder approval necessary for the bid’s success eliminates the pressure-
to-tender problem.  Suppose that M*<A but that A is lower than the shareholders’ estimate of
YI.  In the absence of voting, each shareholder would rationally choose to tender even though
defeating the offer is in the shareholders’ collective interest.  With the VAO mechanism,
however, a shareholder can vote against the offer without fear of suffering a penalty if the offer
succeeds.  Thus, in such a case, shareholders will vote against the offer and the offer will be
defeated. 
(ii) Making shareholder approval sufficient for the bid’s success eliminates the free-rider27
problem.  Suppose that M*>A and that A is higher than the shareholders’ estimate of YI.  In this
case, without the VAO mechanism, each shareholder would rationally choose to hold out even
though accepting the offer is in the shareholders’ collective interest.  The way in which the VAO
mechanism solves this problem is by ensuring that, if the shareholders vote for the offer, the
shareholders will indeed tender.
It is also worth noting that it is possible to separate the two elements of the mechanism
and take only the first element; that is, one could make the winning of a vote a necessary
condition for a rival to take control, but not a sufficient condition.  Doing this would eliminate
the pressure-to-tender problem but not the free-rider problem.  This option might be desirable if,
say, free-riding were regarded as a good way for target shareholders to extract surplus from the
rival (see also the comments in Section V). 
We see that the considered mechanism will lead (with a very high probability) to a
takeover if A exceeds the shareholders’ estimate of YI    and will lead (with a very high
probability ) to the company’s remaining independent if the reverse is the case.  The above
suggests that, assuming all shareholders know YI, the VAO mechanism will produce efficient
outcomes.  However, as noted earlier, it may be the case that YI is uncertain and that most voting
shareholders do not take the time to assess all the new information about YI.  We show next that
the mechanism can work well even under these conditions.
C.  Voting When Shareholders Are Differentially Informed
Managers facing a cash tender offer often argue that shareholders are imperfectly25 Thus, the only informational objection that can be put forward is one based on a claim
that YI is private information of the target’s managers and is not known even to the most
informed shareholders. Such a situation might arise, for example, when the target has
investments in long-term projects (see, e.g., Stein (1988)).  One who is concerned about this
problem, and its ex ante effects, might wish to allow rivals access to the control contest
mechanism only at distinct points in time, with substantial intervals in between (see Lipton and
Rosenblum (1991)).  
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informed about the independent target’s value YI.  To be sure, shareholders know the pre-bid
market price--which reflects the public information about YI  available prior to the making of the
bid.   As noted, however, a considerable amount of new information about YI might be revealed
in the aftermath of a bid.  Thus, it might be argued that voting shareholders will be imperfectly
informed at T=3.   We now show that this problem is not as severe as one might think.  In
particular, for the vote to work well, it is not necessary for all or even most shareholders to
possess the new information about YI.  As demonstrated below, as long as the informed market
makers possess the new information about YI, rational uninformed shareholders will be able to
learn the relevant information from the market price and will vote accordingly.  An efficient
outcome will thereby be attained.
25
Assume initially that R’s bid is in the form of cash – in the amount of  A.  An equilibrium
in this simple model will consist of the following:
(i)   The strategy of each market maker at T = 3 specifying, for any value of YI and bid price
A, what market price he will set; and
(ii)   The strategy of rational uninformed shareholders at T = 4 specifying, for any market price
P that they observe, how they will vote.
Remark: To illustrate, consider the following numerical example.  Suppose that a bidder offers
$100 a share for the company.  In such a case, the equilibrium will be one in which:26More precisely, the market makers will set the price at (1-() Max (A, YI) + ( Min (A,
YI), where ( = [,("H - ½)/"H] is the (very small) probability that, despite the voting by all
rational shareholders in favor of a certain outcome, voting by noise investors will produce the
opposite outcome.
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(i) market makers will set the market price above $100 (at slightly below YI) if YI > $100
and at (slightly below) $100 if YI < $100; and
(ii) rational uninformed shareholders will vote against the offer if and only if they observe a
market price exceeding $100.  
To see that this is an equilibrium, note that, given (i), it is optimal for rational uninformed
shareholders to vote as specified in (ii).  And given (ii), market makers know that (1) if YI < $100
and they set the price at (just slightly below) $100 then the bid will win with high probability,
which will make the set price rational; and that (2) if YI > $100 and they set the price above $100
(just slightly below YI), the bid will fail with high probability, which again will make the set
price rational.
Proposition 4:  Assuming that market makers know YI , the unique equilibrium is the “fully
revealing” equilibrium defined as follows:
(i) At T = 3, the market makers set the market price at (slightly below) max(A, YI);
26 and
(ii) At T = 4, rational uninformed shareholders vote against the offer if the market price P
exceeds  A and vote for the offer otherwise.
Proof:  To see why this is an equilibrium, note first that, given how the pre-vote market price is
set, if P > A, then it must be the case that YI > A and thus it is optimal for the rational
uninformed shareholders to vote for the incumbent; and if P < A, then it must be the case that YI30
< A and thus it is optimal to vote for the offer. 
Furthermore, given the expectation that the rational uninformed shareholders will vote in
the above way, the outcome of the vote will produce a value of (slightly below) max(A, YI).
Thus, the market price set at T = 3 is indeed equal to the company’s expected value in this
equilibrium.
To establish uniqueness, consider an event YI > A.  Given the existence of noise
investors, there is a positive probability that the bid will fail.  Hence the market makers will set a
price P exceeding A.  Seeing this, rational uninformed investors will deduce that it is optimal to
vote against the bid, and so the bid fails almost surely.  Hence P • YI = Max (A, YI) when YI >
A.
On the other hand, suppose YI < A.  Since there is a positive probability that the bid will
fail, the market makers will set a price P below A (how much below will depend on what the
rational uninformed shareholders are expected to do).  Seeing this, rational uninformed investors
will vote for the bid and so the bid succeeds almost surely.  Thus, when YI < A, we must have 
P • A = Max (A, YI).  Hence, we can conclude that in equilibrium the market price must be set
at (approximately) Max(A, YI).           Q.E.D.
D. Offers with Some Uncertainty about Value
Thus far we have assumed that the value of the offer is precisely known, which is
presumably the case for a cash offer. Our conclusions about the ability of shareholders to infer
from the market price the information possessed by the most informed shareholders, however,
generalize to the case in which there is a small amount of uncertainty in the value of the offer.  27 Note that in this case the outcome will not be always the one that would be best in light
of all the publicly available information but rather may depart from it to a small extent.
Specifically, when YI falls in the small interval between A and A2 , the bid will succeed.
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One case with some small uncertainty about the value of the offer is that of a bid that is at
least partly in new debt securities whose value cannot be precisely ascertained by rational
uninformed shareholders. Suppose that the value of the offer,  A,  has support in a small interval
[A1, A2].  The offer might be no longer purely in the form of immediate cash but might include,
say, an element of notes, i.e., a promise to pay some cash in the future.  We assume that informed
shareholders, but not uninformed shareholders,  know the value of A.  Given the smallness of the
interval, it is reasonable to assume that E[YI*YI<A2]<A1.  
In this case, we can show, using reasoning similar to the one employed earlier, that the
unique equilibrium is one in which (i) the market makers set P at (approximately) YI if YI>A2
and at (approximately) A otherwise, and (ii) shareholders vote against the offer if P>A2 and vote
for the offer otherwise.  To see that this is an equilibrium, note that if P > A2, rational
uninformed shareholders can deduce that P = YI > A2 > A, and so it is rational for them to vote
against the offer; and that, if A1<P < A2, then rational uninformed shareholders can deduce that
YI < A2, in which case, given that E[YI*YI <A2]<A1 due to the smallness of [A1,A2], it is
rational to vote for the offer.
27
Another case in which there might be uncertainty about the value of the bid is one in
which the bidder offers existing securities of the bidder (e.g., shares of the bidder). To be sure,
the target’s shareholders could look at the market price of these securities to see what their value
is according to the publicly available information.  In contrast to a cash offer, however, the value
of the offered securities might depend on whether the bid is expected to be successful or not.  If
the offer is in securities of the bidder, success of the offer might raise their value because of28 To see why this state of affairs is an equilibrium, note that, in this considered
equilibrium, if As < YI, market makers will set P just slightly below YI and will set Pb at about IIf
which is less then YI.  In this case, voting against the offer upon observing P > Pb will be rational. 
And given that the offer will fail with high probability, the price set by the market makers to
begin with will be rational.  Also, in this equilibrium, if As > YI, then Pb and P will be set slightly
below As with Pb slightly above P.  In this case, voting for the offer upon observing that P does
not exceed Pb will be rational.  And given that the offer will succeed with high probability, the
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synergy. 
Suppose that the value of offered securities will be As if the bid succeeds and Af if the
bid fails; that informed shareholders including the market makers know the values of  As and Af
(and, as before, the value of YI); and that rational uninformed shareholders (in addition to
knowing not YI but only YI*) do not know the values of As and Af but only know the
distributions from which As and Af are drawn, which have means of As* and Af*. And let us
assume that the impact of the offer’s success on the bidder is small (say, because the bidder is
much larger than the target) and that As and Af are therefore sufficiently close in value so that
they are both on the same side of YI (that is, either they are both higher than YI or they are both
lower than YI) 
In this case, there are two market prices from which inferences can be drawn--the market
price of the target, denoted as before by P, and the market price of the package of the (currently
trading) offered securities, which will be denoted by Pb. Using the same reasoning as before, one
can show that the unique equilibrium is one in which:
(i) the market makers will set the market price of the target P at a level of (slightly below)
max(YI, As) and the market price of the package of offered securities Pb at a level of
(approximately) As if As>YI and a level of (approximately) Af if As<YI.
(ii) The uninformed shareholders will vote against the offer if P>Pb; and will vote for the
offer otherwise.
28price set by the market makers to begin with will be rational.  Uniqueness can be proved using
reasoning similar to the one used in the proof of proposition 4.
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Finally, it should be stressed that the ability of the shareholders to infer from market
prices which outcome of the vote would be value-maximizing does not extend to cases in which
there is substantial uncertainty about the value of the bid. Rivals are able (and should be allowed)
to make offers on any terms and using whatever currency they wish, and bids might be therefore
structured in a way that would make their value quite uncertain. For example, consider the
extreme case in which R offers shareholders a noncash bid made fully of shares in a new “shell”
company which will have no assets if the offer is rejected and which will own the assets of the
target (but under R’s management) if the offer is successful.  In this case the vote on the
“acquisition offer “ is equivalent to a proxy contest, and as such the vote faces all the problems
discussed earlier regarding proxy contests--including the difficulty for R of convincing the
shareholders that a victory by R would benefit them.  For this reason, we do not expect that rivals
will make acquisition offers of this form, and indeed we are not aware of any such offers.
E. Implications for Existing Voting Requirements
In the United States, there are some arrangements that make approval by vote a necessary
condition for a control transfer.  To start with, some states have control share acquisition statutes. 
Such statutes essentially require a bidder to gain majority approval before proceeding with its
bid.  (If the bidder does not gain such approval, the shares it acquires will not have voting power,
and this lack of voting power will eliminate the point of purchasing the shares.) 
Furthermore, all states now allow incumbents to install poison pills.  When poison pills34
are in place, a bidder will be able to proceed with its bid only if it first wins a proxy contest and
replaces the board with directors that will redeem the pill.  In the face of pills, the route that
rivals must pursue is that of putting an offer on the table and then running a proxy contest that is
essentially a referendum about the offer.  According to our analysis, by making approval by vote
a necessary condition, such arrangements provide one element of the proposed approach.
Note that none of these arrangements would make winning such a shareholder
referendum a sufficient condition for the acquisition offer to succeed.  Thus, they do not by
themselves provide both elements of the voting-on-acquisitions-offers mechanism.  However, the
legal rules governing freeze-outs (and the pressure-to-tender that they create) are sufficient
usually to ensure that, if the bidder is allowed to proceed with its offer, tendering would be
worthwhile.  
Note also that the arrangements above would involve a more cumbersome procedure than
the proposed mechanism in that they require shareholders to act twice--once to vote and once (at
least for successful bids) to tender.  In contrast, the proposed mechanism would involve
shareholders’ acting only once. 
Finally, the above discussion has implicitly assumed that there are no charter provisions
that make it difficult or costly for a rival to oust the incumbent in a proxy contest.  In some
companies, where the board is not classified and where shareholders can call a special meeting or
act by written consent, a rival that emerges can quickly get to a vote on replacing the board,
which would serve as a referendum on its offer.  In many other companies, however, there are
“antitakeover” charter provisions that delay or make difficult the access of a bidder to a
shareholder vote on its offer (Coates (2000), Daines and Klausner (2001), Field and Karpoff
(2000)).29 For a full analysis and empirical confirmation of the antitakeover power of classified
boards, see Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2001).
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These antitakeover charter provisions fall into two categories.  The first category includes
arrangements that have the effect of allowing rivals to gain access to a vote only in the next
annual election.  Such companies can be viewed as having an arrangement under which rivals
can gain access to the mechanism only once a year.  Recall that our analysis took as given that
rivals are at a point in time in which they have access to a control contest, and it did not examine
what the optimal spacing of such points in time would be.
The second category of antitakeover charter provisions, however, prevents bidders from
ever having easy access to a shareholder referendum on their offer.  Many companies have
classified boards, with one third of the board seats coming up for election each year.  Classified
boards require a rival that seeks to gain control over the board to win two annual elections in a
row.  And our analysis indicates that such an arrangement makes it difficult for hostile bidders to
gain control no matter when they emerge.  We have shown that shareholders would be reluctant
to vote for a rival in a proxy contest unless the rival puts on the table an offer that guarantees
how they would fare if the rival were to win.  However, when a rival facing a classified board
runs the first proxy contest of the two needed to gain control, it would be difficult for the rival
(given that values of assets change over time) to commit to the price that it would be willing to
offer for the company in the event that it wins both the first election and the second election a
year down the road.  In the absence of such a commitment, however, the rival’s chances of
winning the first election would be reduced.
29 
Turning to Europe, the British City Code on Takeovers also has an arrangement that in
effect makes the success of a takeover bid conditional on the ability of a bidder to win a36
shareholder vote against the incumbent.  Under this arrangement, incumbents are required to be
passive but they may erect whatever defenses are approved by a shareholder vote.  A proposal for
a new EEC Directive on Takeovers, which the EEC Commission put forward but which the
European Parliament narrowly failed to approve, would have led to the adoption of this
arrangement in all EEC countries. In anticipation of the passage of the Directive, various member
states have already enacted takeover laws including this arrangement.  This arrangement again
goes in the direction of conditioning the success of a hostile bidder on the support of
shareholders in a vote, thereby eliminating the pressure-to-tender problem.
It should be noted, however, that, unlike the US, some European countries currently do
not allow a successful bidder a large latitude in proceeding to a freezeout.  In such countries,  the
free-rider problem might be present, and a rival’s ability to win a vote of approval by the target’s
shareholders might be insufficient for a takeover.  The EEC Commission has ordered a study of
the arrangements governing freeze-outs, and such a study should carefully consider the effect of
the rules governing freeze-outs in EEC countries on the efficiency of takeover bids. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has analyzed and contrasted two primary ways for a rival manager to gain
control over a corporation--buying shares and persuading shareholders to vote for the rival.  Both
straight proxy contest and straight takeovers bids suffer from substantial shortcomings.  We have
shown that a combined voting and acquisition offer mechanism works better than either straight
proxy fights or straight takeovers.  It works better than straight proxy fights because having an
acquisition offer on the table may be needed to convey credibly to shareholders that they will be30 Such ex ante effects include the effects of the ex post mechanism on the incumbent’s ex
ante non-verifiable investment in human capital (see generally Hart (1995)), the incumbent’s
choice between short-term and long-term investments (Stein (1988, 1989), Bebchuk and Stole
(1993)), the incumbent’s ex ante level of effort, and the ex ante investments by shareholders in
potential bidders and targets. 
37
made better off by a transfer of control.  It also works better than a straight takeover bid since it
addresses distortions that would otherwise affect shareholders’ tender decisions.  Furthermore,
we have shown that, given the inferences that shareholders can draw from market prices, such a
vote might reflect aggregate information better than has been previously recognized.  And we
have put forward smooth and clean methods for accomplishing the proposed mechanism.  Our
results support the increasing use of voting in connection with acquisition offers in both the US
and Europe. 
Our analysis leaves unresolved certain issues concerning the optimal arrangements for
contests for corporate control.  For example, our analysis assumed that rivals are at a point in
time in which they are able to contest control, and simply examined what would be the best
mechanism for resolving the issue.  Thus, there remains the question of when rivals should have
access to the control transfer mechanism.  Furthermore, while our analysis suggests the
superiority of combining voting with acquisition offers over straight proxy fights and straight
takeovers, it has not sought to identify the best mechanism for control contests.  Indeed, our setup
is not sufficiently comprehensive to allow definitive conclusions in this regard; whereas our
analysis has focused on ensuring an efficient ex post outcome of control contests, there are other
consideration that are relevant for an analysis of the optimal mechanism, such as the effects of
the mechanism on ex ante actions.
30  Extending the analysis in these directions would be a
worthwhile project for subsequent work. 39
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